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Summary. – This paper focuses on the sources and consequences of the instability of tax 
revenue in Sub-Saharan African countries. We take advantage of a unique and extraordinarily 
rich dataset on the composition of tax revenues for a large number of countries. Using panel 
data for 39 countries observed over the period 1980-2005, our results are threefold. Firstly, the 
instability of government tax revenue leads to an instability of both the public investment and 
government consumption, and finally, reduces the level of public investment. Secondly, 
foreign aid inflows appear to be an effective insurance mechanism against the instability of tax 
revenue by lowering the sensitivity of public investment with respect to tax revenue shocks. 
Finally, the reliance on domestic indirect taxation-based systems seems more stabilizing than 
the dependency on trade tax revenue.  
 
Keywords: Tax Instability, Tax Composition, Public Spending, Foreign Aid, Sub-Saharan Africa 
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1 - INTRODUCTION 
 
Tax revenue mobilization in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is not only low compared to spending 
needs (Stotsky and Woldemariam, 1997; Keen and Mansour, 2009) but also suffers from high 
instability (Brun, Chambas and Combes, 2006). Tax revenue instability has been documented as 
particularly important in Sub-Saharan Africa and, from the tax instability measures presented in Table 
1, one can note that countries did not succeed well in eliminating this instability over the period 1980-
2005. Since the beginning of the 2000’s, a small decrease in tax instability has been occurring but it 
still remains an ongoing issue that need to be seriously addressed. As far as the components of tax 
revenue are concerned, we can highlight some stylised facts. Corporate taxes were the most instable 
taxes during the entire period whereas indirect taxes have became slightly less volatile than trade taxes 
since the 90’s. 
Table 1: Instability of tax revenues and spending in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
1980/1985 1986/1990 1991/1995 1996/2000 2001/2005 
Total tax revenue 2.59 2.77 2.64 2.49 2.22 
   Trade tax revenue 3.04 3.18 3.14 3.07 2.79 
   Indirect tax revenue 3.22 3.26 3.08 3.06 2.64 
   Income tax revenue 3.03 2.91 2.83 2.78 2.61 
   Corporate tax revenue 3.32 3.37 3.34 3.41 3.17 
   Individual income tax revenue 3.06 2.96 3.09 2.8 2.73 
      
Public investment 2.92 3.30 3.15 3.30 3.22 
Government consumption 2.24 2.37 2.36 2.42 2.37 
Note: Instability is measured by the standard-deviation of the growth rates of the corresponding variables (in % of GDP) 
over 5-year overlapping sub-periods. Instability is in logarithmic terms.  
 
The primary concern linked with tax revenues instability is that it may result in public spending 
instability which is of deep concern for Sub-Saharan African countries since it was found to be 
detrimental for growth and welfare (Guillaumont et al. 1999; Fatas and Mihov, 2003; Furceri, 2007; 
Loayza et al., 2007). Indeed, instable revenues are costly because they might force the government to 
consequently cut public spending, leading to public spending instability. According to the instability 
measures in Table 1, the instability of both public investment and government consumption have not 
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decreased compared to their levels in the 1980’s and assessing to what extent this fact is due to 
revenue instability is therefore crucial. 
It is worth noting that the public investment ratio seems more stable than the government 
consumption ratio in our sample. This is not very surprising since the government consumption 
contains some items such as wage and salaries which are renewed every year.  
Only two studies, to our knowledge, tackled the problem of tax revenue instability. Lim (1983) 
estimated that tax revenues instability was the major cause of expenditure instability in less developed 
countries in the period going from 1965 to 1973. He therefore urged for further research investigating 
how to reduce the degree of tax revenue instability. Bleaney, Gemmel and Greenaway (1995) analysed 
the sources and the consequences of revenues instability in developing countries. They found that tax 
revenue instability is more common in poor, more open and more inflationary economies. Moreover, 
the cross-section evidence shows that countries with high tax revenue instability tend also to have high 
total expenditure instability. 
Given this background, the aim of this paper is to implement a thorough analysis of tax revenue 
instability in a panel of Sub-Saharan African countries over the period 1980-2005, judging its impact 
on both public investment and government consumption instability and public investment level and 
deriving concrete solutions to deal with that.  
This study takes advantage of a recent and unique dataset on the composition of the tax revenues 
in a long time period compiled by Keen and Mansour (2009). We will first of all assess the 
consequences of tax revenue instability on the volatility of both public investment and government 
consumption and on levels of public investment which is one of the most crucial components of public 
spending for economic growth in developing countries. In a second step, we will investigate the two 
means available to governments to deal with the tax revenue instability.  
We focus solely on African countries because these countries are often unable to resort to 
financial markets (domestic or international) to smooth their revenue. Finding alternative ways of 
dealing with revenue instability in these countries is therefore of foremost importance. At the same 
time, African countries are the recipients of large amounts of external development assistance. We will 
thus check whether and how foreign aid, as an alternative way of financing public spending, can help 
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decreasing the public investment instability and can offset the detrimental effect of tax revenues 
instability. Moreover, countries can also enhance their risk preparedness by analysing the determinants 
of the instability of tax revenue and especially investigating whether a specific tax structure can limit 
the instability of the total tax revenue ratio. 
To preview our findings, we established that tax revenues instability in Sub-Saharan Africa is 
leading to public investment and government consumption instability which in turn generates lower 
public investment ratio and is therefore detrimental to the long term economic growth.  
Our study reveals that there are two main means of dealing with this issue. On the one hand, when 
tax revenues are instable, foreign aid can offset the positive effect of the instability of tax revenue on 
the public investment. On the other hand, we find that the departure from trade taxes toward indirect 
domestic taxes, a reform which is currently occurring in developing countries, is beneficial for limiting 
tax revenue instability.  
In the next section, we discuss the impacts of the instability of tax revenue on both the public 
consumption and investment in Sub-Saharan Africa. Section 3 is devoted to the analysis of the ways to 
deal with tax revenue instability by investigating the role of foreign aid as a risk coping mechanism 
and the stabilizing effect of the reliance on domestic indirect taxation mechanisms rather than the 
dependency on trade tax revenues. Section 4 concludes on the policy implications for African 
countries which can be derived from our results. 
 
2. CONSEQUENCES OF TAX REVENUE INSTABILITY IN THE SSA REGION 
 
The principal objective of this empirical section is to establish the consequences of the high level 
of tax revenue instability in the Sub-Saharan region. We analyse the impact of tax instability on the 
instability of both public investment and government consumption. In a second step, we analyse what 
is the effect of this instability of public spending on the level of public spending. Nevertheless, for the 
impact on the level, our interest relies only on public investment which is one of the productive 
components of public spending crucial for long-term growth (Barro, 1990; Ramirez and Nazmi, 2003). 
As depicted in Figure 1, we are expecting a positive association between tax instability and public 
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6 
spending instability and a negative one between public investment instability and the level of public 
investment. Altogether, we are interested in a relationship between tax revenue instability and public 
expenditures which looks like communicating vessels: tax revenue instability leads to an increase in 
the instability of public investment and the instability of public investment lowers the level of public 
capital spending. 
 
Figure 1: Transmission of Tax Revenues instability on Public Spending Instability and on 
Public Investment Level 
 
 
 
It is plausible to think that the ability of public authorities to provide public goods is weakened by 
the volatility of their revenues. One could oppose the idea that if the variation in the tax revenue ratio 
is perceived as temporary by the governments, they should not move consequently the level of public 
spending. As recommended by Barro (1979), public spending should be smoothed and be based on the 
permanent component of revenue. In this view, public spending should not be affected by tax revenue 
cycles. However, as shown by Akitoby et al. (2006), the public investment component is the most 
erratic category of public expenditure in developing countries. This can be explained by two factors. 
On the one hand, governments face political pressures such that during boom episodes, they can easily 
increase their spending but during downturns, it becomes more difficult to sustain the effort. On the 
second hand, governments might be affected by ‘myopia’ and thus are not always able to identify 
whether the revenue shocks will be temporary or permanent. We can therefore expect a significant 
positive effect of tax instability on both public investment instability and government consumption. 
This instability of government expenditures in developing countries (Talvi, 2005; Akitoby et al., 
2007; Thorthon, 2008; Diallo, 2009) might contribute to reduce the mean level of public spending. 
This hypothesis might seem counterintuitive since several papers underlined the existence of a positive 
relationship between procyclical fiscal policy and the size of the government, namely the voracity and 
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the cyclical ratcheting effects (Collier and Gunning, 1999; Tornell and Lane, 1999; Akitoby et al. 
2006). However, the expenditure category which is mostly affected by these effects is the current 
public expenditures (government consumption). For the public investment category, things appear 
relatively different. Indeed, recent papers point the fact that governments of developing countries tend 
to cut more easily capital expenditures during recessions than the other spending categories (Akitoby 
et al. 2006). This can be partly explained by the lower political cost of a reduction of public 
investments than a reduction of spending on wages and salaries or on current goods and services. We 
can therefore expect a negative association between public investment instability and its level, what is 
detrimental for the long-term capital accumulation. 
 
A. The transmission of the instability of the tax revenue ratio into the instability of public 
spending ratios 
As far as the relationship between the instability of tax revenue and the instability of public 
spending is concerned, Lim (1983) provided the first empirical test. The author concluded that one of 
the main consequences of the instability of tax revenues is to increase the instability of the aggregate 
public spending. By using recent econometric techniques and datasets, we will then be able to provide 
and quantify the intensity of this positive relationship. The estimated econometric model is the 
following: 
Model [1]: ( ) ( ) tititit tisti u ,,,, loglog εηγσθασ +++′++= Χ  
 
where the superscripts s and t refer to the public spending variables, either public investment or 
government consumption, and to the tax variable respectively. σ  is the measure of public spending 
and tax revenue instability. As in Bekaert et al. (2006), we measure it as the 5-year rolling standard 
deviation of the growth rate of the corresponding series expressed as part of GDP.3 Thus, we have 
yearly data on these measures of instability. Because of the way instability is computed, there is a 
suspicion of serial correlation in ti,ε . We will therefore use an OLS estimator with Newey-West 
                                                 
3
 We have not retained the 5-year non overlapping sub-periods as measure of instability because of the limited 
number of observations that this computation generates. 
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standard-errors where the error structure is assumed to be heteroskedastic and first-order 
autocorrelated.  X is the matrix of basic control variables. It includes the proxy for the level of 
development (GDP per capita in log terms) and two indicators of the availability of external sources of 
funding at the government level, namely foreign aid per capita and the external debt as part of GDP (in 
log terms). We expect that both GDP per capita, external debt and foreign aid should be negatively 
correlated to the instability of public spending. iu  and tη  are the country and year fixed-effects which 
allows controlling for the cross-sectional time-invariant heterogeneity and the common shocks, 
respectively. Our hypothesis tested is that 0>θ . 
The models are estimated over the period 1980-2005 with yearly data. Data on tax revenue are 
drawn from the recent work of Keen and Mansour (2009). The public investment ratio is the public 
gross fixed capital formation as part of GDP which is drawn from the IMF World Economic Outlook 
database. Government Consumption as part of GDP represents current spending of the government 
and is drawn from the World Development Indicator (WDI). All the other control variables are also 
extracted from WDI. Descriptive statistics of all the variables used in the paper are presented in 
Appendix A. 
 
Results 
Table 2 shows the estimation of the model (1). The first two columns present the results for the 
public investment instability whereas in the two subsequent columns, results are for the government 
consumption. In columns 1 and 3, we present the results with a unique control variable, GDP per 
capita, and in columns 2 and 4 we add the levels of foreign aid per capita and external debt. The 
results show that the level of economic development is negatively correlated with the instability of 
public spending. We notice also that foreign aid smoothes the public investment ratio whereas external 
debt has no effect.  
- Table 2 - 
 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2010.25 
 
 
9 
Regarding now the variable of interest, the results confirm the hypothesis that the instability of tax 
revenue is translated into instability of public spending. The coefficients are highly significant at 1% 
level and remain robust after the introduction of additional control variables. The coefficient 
measuring the impact of the instability of tax revenue is higher for public investment than for 
government consumption traducing the fact that public investment is the component more prone to a 
decrease than the current spending during bust periods. Having established that the instability of tax 
revenue results in the instability of both public investment and government consumption, we will now 
assess the impact of public investment instability on the level of public investment. 
 
B. The detrimental effect of the instability of public investment ratio on its level 
The model [2] tests the hypothesis that there might be a negative association between the 
instability of public investment and its level ( )0<β . 
 
Model [2]: ( ) ( ) tititistiti us ,,,, loglog εηλσβα +++′++= Υ  
 
This can be due to the fact that episodes of booms and busts in the dynamics of public spending 
reduce the level of public spending observed in the end of the period. On contrary, when the public 
spending is relatively stable over time, it results in a higher level of spending than in the previous 
scenario.  
The matrix Y of control variables includes the level of economic development, the level of foreign 
aid per capita, the level of external debt, the urbanization rate and the level of inflation.4 The former is 
included to capture the positive association between income and the government size (the Wagner 
law) while the second variable controls for the existence of economies of scale in a context of high 
urbanization rate. The dependant variable s represents the ratio of public investment as part of GDP.  
In the model [2], the coefficient β identifies the correlation between the instability of public 
investment and its level. While the model [1] informed us that this instability of spending takes its 
                                                 
4
 These variables are often used as main determinants of capital and social spending in developing countries 
(Dreher, 2008; Fosu, 2007). 
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source in the instability of tax revenue, it seems more interesting to directly measure the contribution 
of the instability of tax revenue on the level of public spending, which passes through the channel of 
public spending instability. This task is devoted to the model [3]. To evaluate the importance of the 
instability of tax revenue on the level of public spending, we use the instability tax instability as an 
instrument for public investment instability. 
 
Model [3]: ( ) tititistiti uzs ,,,2,log εηλβα +++′++= Υ)  
 
where z represents the prediction of the log term of the instability of public investment from a first 
stage regression with the tax revenue instability being the instrumental variable.5  
In the model [3], β2 quantifies the effect of the instability of public spending induced by the 
instability of tax revenue. The comparison between β in the model [2] and β2 in the model [3] is 
interesting. Indeed, β measures the effect of the instability of government spending on the level of 
spending while β2 measures the effect of the component of the instability of government spending 
explained by the instability of tax revenue.  
The models [2] and [3] can also be represented in a dynamic form in which the lagged value of the 
dependent variable is accounted for. This is justified by the fact that government spending is often 
characterized by a strong inertia and controlling for the lagged value of the dependent variable allows 
taking into account this dynamic property of the dependent variable. However, this leads to a bias in 
the estimation of the coefficient associated with the lagged dependent variable in the presence of 
country fixed-effects.  
The estimator of the generalized method of moments (GMM) designed for dynamic panel data is 
useful is this context. We therefore use the two-step System-GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond, 
                                                 
5
 Identifying the transmission channels with the instrumental variables techniques is now common in the 
literature. Fatas and Mihov (2003) used a similar approach to investigate how the discretionary fiscal policy can 
reduce economic growth through the channel of the instability of growth. One may argue that tax instability is 
not a proper exclusion restriction in this model but we are only interested in assessing whether the public 
investment instability component induced solely by the instability of tax revenue is significantly related to the 
ratio of public investment. 
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1998) with the Windmeijer (2005) correction of standard errors to estimate the dynamic specifications 
of models [2] and [3].6  
 
Results 
Table 3 presents the results of the estimations of models 2 and 3. In the first column, the results 
obtained by the ordinarily least squares (OLS) with country and year fixed effects, suggest a negative 
and significant relationship between the instability of the public investment ratio and the public 
investment ratio.  
- Table 3 - 
 
In column 2, the instability of public investment is instrumented by the instability of tax revenue 
in order to account for the transmission channel of the effect of the instability of tax revenue. The 
coefficient of the instability of public investment increases in absolute term and is ten times larger than 
in column 1. This result reinforces the idea that one channel through which the instability of tax 
revenue reduces public investment is the instability of spending. The story remains the same even 
when a dynamic panel specification is estimated by the System-GMM-IV method (column 3). Once 
again, after instrumenting the instability of spending by the instability of taxes, the negative 
contribution of the former remains.  
The control variables included in the models exhibit the expected signs. Foreign aid and the 
external debt are positively correlated with the public investment ratio in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 The System-GMM allows the instrumentation of potential endogenous variables by their lagged values. It 
combines equation in levels and equations in first differences in a system which is estimated jointly. Two tests 
are presented in order to validate the specification. Firstly, the autocorrelation test of order two of the residuals in 
differences (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and secondly, the test of over-identification (Hansen test). 
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3. HOW TO DEAL WITH TAX REVENUES INSTABILITY? 
 
This section is devoted to the analysis of two solutions available to governments in order to cope 
with or to manage the tax revenue instability. Firstly, we expose the stabilizing role of foreign aid and 
secondly, we investigate the stabilizing effect of the dependency on a domestic taxation-based system.  
 
A. How does foreign aid smooth public capital spending? 
Three main channels can be identified to explain how foreign aid might decrease the extent to 
which tax revenue instability is translated into public spending instability. First, foreign aid inflows 
can be countercyclical and, in presence of tax revenue shocks, permit to smooth public spending. 
Second, if public investment is largely financed by foreign aid then the public investment sensitivity to 
the tax revenue shocks might be lowered. Lastly, foreign aid can stabilize the overall economy (the tax 
base) and then the government tax revenue, and by this way, may reduce the instability of public 
investment. 
 
Foreign aid: a risk coping mechanism? 
We evaluate the potential of foreign aid to act as an effective insurance mechanism to which 
governments of Sub-Saharan African countries can resort to smooth their total revenues and then their 
developmental spending. More precisely, we examine the effect of foreign aid on the elasticity of 
public investment instability with respect to tax revenue instability. The following model is then 
specified to quantify the insurance effect played by foreign aid: 
 
Model [4]:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) tititititit tit tisti uAA ,,,3,,2,1, logloglogloglog εηγθσθσθασ +++′++∗++= Χ  
 
where A is foreign aid per capita. The insurance role of foreign aid is validated when 01 >θ  and 
02 <θ . This implies that the total effect of the instability of tax revenue on public investment 
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instability is strongly reduced at high levels of foreign aid per capita received. Because we expect the 
two coefficients to have opposite signs, the threshold level of foreign aid (in $US per capita terms) 
which fully stabilizes (offsets) the effect of tax instability is given by the following formula: 






−=
2
1exp*
θ
θ
)
)
A . 
 
- Table 4 - 
 
The results show that there is a nonlinear effect of tax revenue instability on the instability of 
public investment which depends on the level of foreign aid. As expected, the coefficient of the 
additive term of the instability of tax revenue is positive and significant in the two specifications 
(column 1 and column 2). However, the interaction of this variable with the level of foreign aid per 
capita exhibits a negative and significant coefficient. This confirms that foreign aid reduces the 
elasticity of spending shocks to tax revenue shocks. The full offsetting of the impact of tax revenue 
instability occurs for levels of foreign aid per capita higher than 120 $US per year. We conclude that 
the mean level of aid per capita (57 US$, in the sample) enables an absorption of 84 percent of the 
destabilizing effect of the instability of tax revenue on public investment instability, compared to the 
extreme case of a zero aid situation. 
 
The initial presence of aid inflows in the country 
An additional way of explaining the stabilizing effect of foreign aid on public spending might rely 
in the fact that foreign aid was already financing a large part of public investment in the country thus 
reducing the propensity of public investment to be instable. We will therefore test whether large 
inflows of foreign aid in the time period before tax revenue shocks are decreasing the destabilizing 
effect of current tax revenue instability on public investment7. In the model [5], an interactive variable 
between tax revenue instability and the five year lagged level of foreign aid is introduced. 
                                                 
7
 Instability being measured as the 5 year rolling standard deviation, the level of foreign aid preceding the tax 
shock is the one in t-5. 
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Model [5]:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) tititititit tit tisti uAA ,,5,35,,2,1, logloglogloglog εηγθσθσθασ +++′++∗++= −− Χ  
 
The results are presented in columns 3 and 4 of Table 4. We find that 01 >θ  and 02 <θ , 
meaning that a higher level of tax revenue instability is translated into public investment volatility but 
this effect is decreased in the presence of large foreign aid inflows in the 5 years preceding the tax 
revenue shock. This result is robust to the addition of external debt as control variable in column 4. 
 
The channel of the stabilization of the government tax revenue 
In our investigation of the mechanics underlining the contribution of foreign aid on public 
investment spending stabilization, we ask if a part of the total stabilizing effect of foreign aid might 
pass through the channel of the stabilization of government tax revenues. Foreign aid can reduce the 
instability of public tax revenue by enhancing the administrative capacity of the public sector and its 
efficiency in tax mobilization. Moreover, external development assistance subject to conditionality can 
enhance the macroeconomic management and institutional quality in receiving countries, which in 
turn lower the aggregate volatility. 
Thus, by lowering the instability of tax revenue in recipient countries aid can contribute to 
smoothing the level of public spending over the time. However, the contribution of foreign aid into 
aggregate stability is not always recognized in the literature. Some authors (Rajan and Subramanian, 
2009) pointed that aid can lead to a real exchange rate appreciation which is an obvious source of 
macroeconomic instability in developing countries. It thus results that quantifying the relevance of the 
channel of aggregate stability due to foreign aid is empirical. We take advantage of the recent 
literature on foreign aid in developing countries to breakdown the contribution of aid to the stability of 
public investment into the ‘indirect effect’ – aid stabilizes the economy and then the government 
revenues – and the ‘direct effect’ of aid.  
The methodology described in Gomanee et al. (2005) is used to address this issue. The method 
consists in a two-stage approach. Firstly, we investigate the relationship between aid and the 
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transmission channel (here, the instability of total tax revenues). The residual term of this first 
estimation measures the component of the tax revenue instability not explained by foreign aid.  
 
Model [6]: ( ) ( ) tititit ti uA ,,, loglog εηβασ ++++=  
 
The second stage consists in estimating two equations. The first one is designed to measure the 
direct effect of foreign aid on the instability of public investment by including both the instability of 
tax revenue and foreign aid. More specifically, we have 
 
Model [7]: ( ) ( ) ( ) titititittisti uA ,,,,1, logloglog εηγσλθασ +++′+++= Χ  
 
The second one replaces the effective value of tax revenue instability by its residual component 
estimated in the model [6]. It results that the coefficient associated with foreign aid in this 
specification measures the ‘total effect’ of aid on public spending instability. This leads to 
Model [8]: ( ) ( ) titititittisti uA ,,,,2, ˆloglog εηγσλθασ +++′+++= Χ  
 
Finally, the indirect effect (expressed in percentage of the total effect) of foreign aid which passes 
through the channel of the stabilization of the government revenues is given by: 
( )
2
12100
θ
θθ −
× .  
The results of the estimations are presented in Table 5. In column 1, we see that the value of β  is 
about - 0.20. This suggests a strong and significant negative correlation between the instability of tax 
revenue and foreign aid.  
- Table 5 – 
 
In column 2, the direct effect of foreign aid (obtained by controlling for observed instability of tax) is 
close to - 0.20. Finally, in column 3 the instability of tax revenue is replaced by the residual term of 
tax instability derived from the specification of column 1. We notice that the ‘total effect’ of foreign 
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aid is then -0.26. It thus comes that the indirect contribution of foreign through the macroeconomic 
stability channel is around 17% of the total potential stabilizing effect of aid. The main conclusion that 
comes after this result is that the ‘indirect channel’ tackled here is quite low and then foreign aid acts 
like a spending smoother primarily through the insurance channel discussed in the two previous sub-
sections and not necessarily through the stabilization of the government tax revenues. 
 
B. How can tax composition affect revenue instability? 
This section is devoted to the understanding of the sources of tax revenue instability in Sub-
Saharan Africa and of the ways to reduce it. We take advantage of the new dataset released by Keen 
and Mansour (2009) which includes disaggregated tax data on: international trade taxes, indirect taxes 
(VAT, sales taxes and excises) and income taxes (individuals’ and corporate income taxes) are 
expressed in percent of GDP.  
We focus primarily on the stabilizing effect of the domestic taxation-based systems vis-a-vis the 
dependency on trade tax revenues. The hypothesis tested is that a high dependency on trade taxes 
rather than on domestic taxes (indirect or direct) leads to more revenue instability because trade taxes 
are more vulnerable to external shocks (Bleaney et al. 1995). In contrast, the dependency on domestic 
indirect taxes for example, should be associated with low instability of tax revenue because the 
corresponding tax base, mainly the private consumption, is more stable and relatively less affected by 
the business cycle.8  
Looking at the stabilizing effect of the reliance on domestic taxes is also a value added to the 
recent literature which has analyzed the effectiveness of the domestic tax instruments in the recovery 
of tax revenues looses after the trade liberalization in many developing countries (Baunsgaard and 
Keen, 2010). Our paper therefore adds to this literature another relevant motive to enhance the 
efficiency of the domestic tax instruments by looking not at the effect on the level of the tax revenues 
collected, but at the stability of this level.  
 
                                                 
8
 Even though about 55 percent on average (Ebrill et al., 2001) of the value-added tax is collected at the border 
on imports, the remaining 45 percent rely on domestic consumption and are therefore likely to be more stable. 
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In order to quantify the differential effects on tax instability of the different categories of taxes, 
several specifications can be retained. Indeed, the first way to quantify the differential effect of the 
dependency on trade tax revenues rather than domestic tax revenues is to explain the instability of the 
total tax revenue ratio by the share of trade tax revenues in the total tax revenues. This is described by 
the model [9]: 
Model [9]: ( ) tititititi uttx ,,1,,log εηθδασ ++++′+= Χ  
 
where ttx represents the logarithm of the ratio of the trade tax revenues over the total tax revenues in 
each country, ti ,σ  is the instability of total taxes. X is the matrix of control variables.  
To confront the effect of the dependency on trade tax revenue with that of the domestic tax 
dependency, the same model is estimated by replacing ttx by the logarithm of domestic tax revenue 
divided by the total tax revenues (dtx) 
 
Model [10]: ( ) tititititi udtx ,,2,,log εηθδασ ++++′+= Χ  
 
While the previous approach seems interesting to give a first look at the respective effects of the 
dependency on trade and domestic tax revenues, it does not allow estimating in the same equation, the 
effects of the dependency on trade tax vis-à-vis the domestic tax. In fact, because of the high and 
negative colinearity between these two variables (the sum of the two leads to 100%), introducing 
additively the two variables in the equation may induce a bias.  
We tackle this potential issue by replacing both the trade tax and the domestic tax dependency by 
a new variable R which is the ratio of the domestic tax revenues divided by the trade tax revenues to 
approximate the structure of the taxation system in each country. Therefore, an increase in this ratio 
should be associated to less instability of the government tax revenues according to our hypothesis that 
the reliance on a domestic taxation system is more stabilizing. The specification derived from this is 
presented in model [11]: 
Model [11]: ( ) ( ) tititititi uR ,,3,, loglog εηθδασ ++++′+= Χ  
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The matrix of control variables includes the standard determinants of the instability of taxes (see 
Lim, 1983; Bleaney et al. 1995) and other potential correlates. Among the structural factors we have 
GDP per capita, country size (population), trade openness, and the level of natural resources rent. The 
other determinants are shocks variables: the GDP per capita growth instability, the terms of trade 
instability and the inflation volatility.  
We expect that the instability of the tax base (GDP per capita instability) and both the inflation and 
terms of trade volatility should be positively correlated with the instability of total tax revenues. The 
level of economic development (GDP per capita) should be negatively associated with the instability 
of taxes because it proxies for the degree of risk management and diversification of productions 
activities, which can lower the extent of volatility. The country size might also reduce the instability of 
tax revenue because small countries are more prone to covariant shocks than larger countries.  
The contribution of trade openness to tax instability is less striking. On the one hand, trade 
openness might proxy for an openness policy behind which there exists a willingness to provide a 
better management of the economic affairs, good institutions and policies for competitiveness. On the 
other hand, trade openness might proxy for the “natural openness” which increases the vulnerability of 
a small open economy to external shocks. Altogether, the sign of the coefficient associated to the trade 
openness variable (exports plus imports divided by the GDP) is ambiguous. Finally, we expect a 
positive association between the levels of natural resources rent and tax revenue instability because the 
natural resources prices are known to be highly volatile. 
Regarding the shocks, we expect that each type of shocks will increase the instability of 
government tax revenues. All the data on control variables are drawn from the World Development 
Indicators (2009). The estimation concerns the period 1980-2005 and the estimator is a two-way fixed-
effects OLS method with Newey-West standard-errors accounting for a heteroskedastic and first-order 
autoregressive error structure in the residuals.  
 
Results: The effect of the tax composition on the instability of revenues 
Table 6 shows the estimation of the coefficients associated with the tax structure variables. The 
most important result which emerges in the three first columns is that the high dependency on trade 
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taxes is a significant and positive determinant of the instability of government revenue in SSA and this 
appears to be robust to the alternative specifications used. On contrary, the dependency on domestic 
taxes has a stabilizing effect which can be observed in columns 2 and 3.  
 
- Table 6 - 
 
Domestic taxes are composed of both direct taxes, on personal and companies’ income, and 
indirect taxes, such as value added taxes or excises, so we investigate in the last three columns of 
Table 6 whether the stabilizing effect of a higher reliance on domestic taxes is due to direct taxes or to 
domestic indirect taxes.  
We breakdown the domestic tax revenues into the indirect tax and the direct tax revenue ratios and 
confront their respective impacts of the instability of the government tax revenue in Africa. However, 
since our test consists in comparing the respective effects of direct tax revenue ratio relative to the 
contribution of the reliance on trade tax revenues in column 4 and domestic indirect tax ratio 
compared to trade tax dependency in column 5 there might be a colinearity problem. Indeed, as 
mentioned by Bleaney et al. (1995), the two tax variables in column 4 are necessarily negatively 
correlated with the domestic indirect tax ratio (the sum of the three leads to 100) and an arithmetical 
transformation is needed to reduce the colinearity problem. To deal with that, we follow Bleaney et al. 
(1995) by computing the dependency on the direct tax revenues and on the domestic indirect tax 
revenues as the level of these tax revenues divided by the level of the total tax revenue excluding trade 
taxes. We use these same measures for direct taxes dependency and domestic indirect taxes 
dependency in the last column of Table 6, but include simultaneously the two variables in the same 
equation both as a robustness check and to allow for a better interpretation of the effects.  
In column 4, the coefficient associated with the dependency on direct taxes is non significant 
whereas a higher dependency on indirect taxes (columns 5 and 6) is significantly associated with 
decreased tax instability.  
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Because the domestic indirect taxes have undergone several reforms in developing countries over 
the period 1980-2005, the impact of domestic indirect taxes on the instability of tax revenue might not 
be constant over the period. Put differently, it is possible that the effect of domestic indirect taxes 
varies over time and thus becomes more significant in the recent period, a period characterized by 
peaks in the VAT adoption in Sub-Saharan Africa and by several reforms taken to improve the tax 
administration. The era of VAT adoption in developing countries is associated with significantly more 
domestic indirect tax revenue being collected (Keen and Lockwood, 2010) and we investigate whether 
this has lead to more stable tax revenue in Sub-Saharan African countries.  
To tackle this issue, we perform cross-sectional rolling regressions year by year to assess the 
distinctive impact of the dependency on indirect taxes on the instability of tax revenue at each year. 
Figure 2 depicts the evolution of the coefficient associated with the indirect tax revenue variable. A 
greater dependency on domestic indirect taxes significantly has decreased the instability of tax 
revenues mainly since the end of the 1990s in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Source: Authors’ calculations 
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The reinforced negative effect of indirect taxes dependency on government revenues instability in 
the recent period coincides in fact with the period of more VAT adopters in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Figure 3).  
 
Source: Authors’ calculations and Ebrill et al. (2001). 
 
Beyond the stabilizing effect of a higher dependency on domestic indirect taxes, other variables 
are also significant determinants of tax instability on which governments should focus. In Table 6, we 
can notice that large countries experiment less instability of their total tax revenue. In large countries, 
the government takes advantage of the spatial dispersion (geographical dispersion) of the taxpayers, 
what leads to a more stable revenue collected since citizens in large countries do not experiment the 
same shocks at the same time. This result seems close to the conclusion of Furceri and Ribeiro (2009) 
who found that large countries exhibit a low instability of the government consumption ratio.  
Regarding the shocks variables, inflation volatility and the instability of the aggregate tax base 
(GDP per capita instability) are significantly and positively associated with the instability of tax 
revenues. These results highlight the importance of the macroeconomic stability and the disinflation 
policies as among the main policy agenda to reduce the instability of government tax revenue in 
Africa. Moreover, the level of natural resources rents also appears positively correlated with the 
instability of government revenues in Africa (columns 1 and 4). This can be explained by the 
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instability in the oil price which is transmitted into government revenues what reinforces the 
macroeconomic uncertainty and the difficulties for these countries in the conduct of fiscal and 
developmental policies.   
 
5. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
Tax revenues instability has proved to be a crucial issue for decades in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
therefore really needs to be addressed. In this paper we investigated the consequences of tax revenues 
instability in a panel of 39 Sub-Saharan African countries over the period 1980-2005 and derived 
solutions in order to mitigate it. Tax revenue instability in Sub-Saharan Africa is not only high but also 
highly detrimental since we found that it leads to increased public spending volatility. Moreover, we 
found robust evidence that high instability of the public investment has a negative impact on the level 
of public investment. 
Given these negative consequences of tax revenues instability, we studied how governments could 
cope with and/or manage the instability of tax revenues. Firstly, we found that foreign aid acts as a 
buffer mechanism to counter the detrimental impact of the instability of tax revenues on the public 
capital spending. Secondly, we analysed what factors could reduce the instability of tax revenue per 
se. We found that tax composition matters. A lower reliance on trade taxes and a higher dependency 
on domestic indirect taxes lead significantly to low levels of instability of tax revenues. Therefore, the 
departure from trade taxes toward indirect domestic taxes, which is currently occurring in developing 
countries, is beneficial for limiting tax revenues instability. Foreign aid can also help Sub-Saharan 
African countries to achieve more rapidly and efficiently these tariff-tax reforms. 
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Table 2: Impact of the instability of tax revenue on the instability of public spending, 1980-2005 
 
 
 
  Public Investment instability  Governement Consumption instability 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Tax revenue instability  0.226*** 0.215***  0.154*** 0.156*** 
  (0.0597) (0.0611)  (0.0402) (0.0402) 
GDP per capita   -0.281 -0.208  -0.0828 -0.185 
  (0.174) (0.219)  (0.0944) (0.128) 
Foreign aid per capita   -0.216**   -0.0700 
   (0.0945)   (0.0681) 
External debt   0.152   -0.0953 
   (0.127)   (0.0858) 
Constant  4.228*** 3.564**  2.667*** 3.672*** 
  (0.864) (1.479)  (0.486) (1.046) 
Observations  834 801  833 802 
Number of countries   39 38  39 38 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. All the variables are expressed in their natural logarithmic terms. The OLS 
estimator with Newey-West standard-errors and country and year fixed effects is used. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
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Table 3: How the instability of tax revenue lowers the level of public spending, 1980-2005 
 
 Public Investment Ratio 
 OLS-FE IV-FE System-GMM-IV 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Public investment ratio (t-1)   0.767*** 
   (0.068) 
Public investment instability  -0.0575** -0.792*** -0.112** 
 (0.0285) (0.217) (0.0443) 
GDP per capita 0.243** 0.127 0.118 
 (0.111) (0.164) (0.0973) 
Urbanization rate -0.609*** -0.872** -0.248* 
 (0.209) (0.374) (0.150) 
Inflation  -0.0739 0.286 0.158 
 (0.132) (0.228) (0.137) 
Foreign aid per capita 0.203*** 0.0788 0.220 
 (0.065) (0.101) (0.220) 
External debt 0.411*** 0.411*** 0.0957 
 (0.087) (0.112) (0.114) 
Constant 0.283  -1.018 
 (1.100)  (1.115) 
Observations 687 687 685 
Number of countries 36 36 36 
Number of instruments .. .. 34 
AR(1)  p-value .. .. 0.000 
AR(2)  p-value .. .. 0.869 
Hansen OID p-value .. .. 0.963 
Note: Robust standard errors with Newey-West correction for autocorrelation in parentheses. 
Country and year fixed effects included in all estimations All the variables are expressed in 
log terms. In column (2), the instability of public investment is instrumented by the instability 
of total taxes revenue. In column (3), the two-step estimator with the Windmeijer (2005) 
correction for finite sample bias has been used. In the GMM-System estimation, the level of 
inflation, the rate of urbanization and year dummies are considered as exogenous, the lagged 
dependent variable is treated as predetermined and the public investment instability and the 
level of foreign aid, the level of external debt and the level of GDP are considered as 
endogenous and instrumented with one lag. We include as external instrument the logarithm 
instability of tax revenue. AR(2) refers to the probability of the test of 2nd order 
autocorrelation of Arellano and Bond (1991) of the residuals in first differences. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4: The stabilizing effect of foreign aid in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1980-2005 
 Public Investment Instability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Foreign aid per capita 0.430* 0.449*   
 (0.256) (0.265)   
Tax revenue instability * Foreign aid -0.243** -0.270***   
 (0.0945) (0.0975)   
Tax revenue instability 1.175*** 1.281*** 0.993*** 1.095*** 
 (0.390) (0.400) (0.364) (0.380) 
Foreign aid per capita (t-5)   0.462* 0.431 
   (0.258) (0.271) 
Tax revenue instability * Foreign aid (t-5)   -0.200** -0.227** 
   (0.0880) (0.0922) 
GDP per capita -0.327* -0.195 -0.239 -0.0369 
 (0.174) (0.218) (0.177) (0.207) 
External debt  0.169  0.227** 
  (0.125)  (0.114) 
Constant 2.755 0.785 2.253 0.313 
 (0) (1.789) (1.488) (1.854) 
Observations 825 801 787 767 
Number of countries 39 38 39 38 
Joint significance of instability variables, p-
value 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0004 0.0006 
Threshold of foreign aid per capita $US a 126 $ 116 $   
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Countries and year fixed-effects are included. The OLS 
estimator with Newey-West standard-errors is applied to the data.  
a
 refers to the level of foreign aid which fully offsets the impact of the instability of tax revenue on the 
instability of public developmental expenditures. It has been obtained after taking the first derivative of 
public spending with respect to the instability of tax revenue.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
   
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2010.25 
 
 
28 
Table 5: Public Investment Instability and aid: the channel of tax base stabilization 
 
VARIABLES Tax Revenue Instability  Public Investment Instability 
 (1)  (2) (3) 
     
Tax Revenue Instability   0.215***  
   (0.0611)  
Residual Term Instability Tax    0.215*** 
    (0.0611) 
Foreign Aid per capita -0.196***  -0.216** -0.258*** 
 (0.0686)  (0.0945) (0.0950) 
GDP per capita   -0.208 -0.208 
   (0.219) (0.219) 
External Debt   0.152 0.152 
   (0.127) (0.127) 
Constant 3.531***  3.564** 4.243*** 
 (0.301)  (1.479) (1.477) 
Observations 866  801 801 
Number of countries 40  38 38 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Countries and year fixed-effects are included.  
The OLS estimator with Newey-West standard-errors is applied to the data.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 6 : Effect of the tax composition on the instability of tax revenues 
 Dependent variable : Total tax revenue instability 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Tax composition variables       
       
Trade taxes dependency 0.237***   0.227*** 0.248*** 0.256*** 
 (0.0808)   (0.0865) (0.0807) (0.0871) 
Domestic taxes dependency  -0.437***     
  (0.153)     
Ratio Domestic/Trade taxes   -0.275***    
   (0.0733)    
Direct taxes dependency     0.0541  -0.0401 
    (0.117)  (0.128) 
DomesticIndirect taxes      -0.0777* -0.0818* 
dependency     (0.0464) (0.0467) 
       
Structural factors       
       
GDP per capita 0.0109 -0.247 -0.0571 0.0125 -0.0179 -0.0208 
 (0.216) (0.179) (0.195) (0.216) (0.195) (0.196) 
Population -2.511*** -2.674*** -2.688*** -2.514*** -2.644*** -2.650*** 
 (0.636) (0.636) (0.639) (0.637) (0.645) (0.647) 
Trade openness -0.234* -0.237* -0.229* -0.238* -0.232* -0.229 
 (0.139) (0.132) (0.134) (0.140) (0.138) (0.139) 
Natural resources rents 1.402** 0.202 0.882 1.452** 1.136 1.085 
 (0.680) (0.669) (0.635) (0.687) (0.693) (0.701) 
       
Shocks variables       
       
GDP per capita instability 0.218*** 0.196*** 0.211*** 0.219*** 0.216*** 0.216*** 
 (0.0471) (0.0486) (0.0476) (0.0465) (0.0465) (0.0462) 
Inflation volatility 0.0730* 0.0759** 0.0673* 0.0737* 0.0788** 0.0788** 
 (0.0384) (0.0371) (0.0366) (0.0383) (0.0382) (0.0382) 
Terms of trade volatility 0.0660 0.0451 0.0577 0.0678 0.0602 0.0584 
 (0.0417) (0.0393) (0.0397) (0.0416) (0.0411) (0.0407) 
Constant 39.96*** 46.54 45.72*** 39.84 42.84*** 43.08*** 
 (9.916) (0) (10.17) (0) (9.984) (10.08) 
Observations 576 576 571 576 570 570 
Countries 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. OLS with Newey-West standard-errors and country and year fixed-
effects is used. All the variables are expressed in log terms. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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APPENDICES 
 
 
Appendix 1 – Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Tax Revenues 
     
Total tax revenue instability (log) 875 2.535 .7538 .3500 5.667 
Trade tax revenue instability (log) 875 3.044 .7951 .7890 6.456 
Indirect tax revenue instability (log) 869 3.027 .8923 .6396 5.725 
Income tax revenue instability (log) 875 2.806 .7229 .5536 5.507 
Corporate tax revenue instability (log) 800 3.321 .7902 1.074 6.244 
Individual tax revenue instability (log) 806 2.909 .7832 .2425 6.365 
Trade Tax dependency (log) 1027 3.266 .7309 -1.555 4.504 
Domestic Tax dependency (log) 1028 3.868 .5270 .5993 4.5559 
Ratio Domestic/Trade taxes 1022 5.197 .938 1.949 10.701 
Direct Tax dependency (log) 1033 3.504 .5947 .5247 4.5262 
Indirect Domestic Tax Dependency (log) 1024 3.490 .9863 -3.157 4.463 
      
Public Spending 
     
Public investment instability (log) 856 3.2187 .9237 -3.7879 6.0627 
Government consumption instability (log) 837 2.371 .770 .1914 4.304 
Public investment ratio (log) 966 1.8750 .7380 -2.2671 4.5502 
      
Control Variables 
     
GDP per capita instability (log) 846 1.0907 .8242 -1.5944 3.4338 
Terms of trade instability (log) 698 2.1875 .8917 -1.8921 4.2694 
Inflation (log) 864 4.7288 .1770 4.4111 6.2761 
Inflation Volatility (log) 744 1.7087 .9939 -1.021 5.073 
Natural Resources Rent (log(1+x)) 953 .04804 .0945 0 .8652 
Population (log) 1040 15.2708 1.6125 11.0729 18.7668 
Openness (log) 991 4.1226 .5323 1.8438 5.6176 
GDP per capita (log) 997 6.1333 1.0440 4.5226 8.9994 
External debt (%GNI) (log) 943 4.2751 .73169 1.5905 6.2185 
Foreign aid per capita (log) 1023 4.0468 .6686 .1038 6.5077 
 
 
Appendix 2 – List of countries (39 Sub-Saharan African Countries) 
 
Benin, Burundi, Burkina Faso, Botswana, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Comoros, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra 
Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
